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Chapter V
Philosophy and politics, 
or about a romantic and a pragmatist
1.
We would like to go on to the terrain which is perhaps the most 
difficult to catch and describe, which may lie at the origin of the 
most serious criticism, which, finally, requires one’s own choice -  
in a word (to paraphraze the young Habermas from a famous 
review of Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics), which 
requires thinking "with Rorty against Rorty". We will follow here the 
path of numerous texts, grouping and separating them depending 
on attempts of answers given over the years to some basic 
questions, and some basic tensions that are born. The question 
we want to discuss here pertains to the fundamental -  both for 
Rorty and for his critics as well -  issue of the relation between 
philosophy and politics which makes Rorty bashed from all sides, 
philosophical and political, radical, leftist, postmodern, feminist as 
well as neoconservative and rightist (whatever the above labels 
were to mean, what is significant is their opposition).
Let us say in the most general terms: Rorty in his philosophical 
and political choices is an exceptional figure (for his attitude to the 
philosophy/politics relation, to the theory/practice distinction etc. 
etc. is exceptional). Philosophically, he is in accordance with 
contemporary French postmodern philosophy, with Derrida, 
Foucault, Lyotard -  despite numerous more or less specific 
differences revealing themselves over the years, as well as 
changing over the years -  therefore he is often referred to as 
"postmodernist" (which, incidentally, does not mean much1) and
1 To see how misleading such classifications are, suffice it to have a look at 
the book by John McGowan, Postmodernism and Its Critic (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 
1991), in which Rorty and Lyotard together form a category of "postmodern 
pragmatists" -  a point hardly acceptable unless one knows and writes only of 
Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition, as is the case with McGowan. I attempted 
to outlined differences between them in my Polish book, Rorty and Lyotard. In 
the Labyrinths of Postmodernity.
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the greatest and most serious philosophical challenge to him is 
Jürgen Habermas. On the other hand, politically, he agrees with 
Habermas’ social democratic choice and disagrees with radical 
(especially in the USA), basically leftist account of politics on the 
part of promoters and followers of French postmodernists. From 
the same ph ilosoph ica l -  pos t-N ie tzschean  and 
post-Heideggerian -  conclusions he draws different, further 
conclusions in social and political matters. So, he is different from 
Habermas and the Frenchmen at the same time, although they 
differ radically between themselves; asked which differences are 
more important to him, Rorty would presumably answer that 
political ones as philosophy in his view is the domain devoid (at 
least "in the short run") of practical meaning in social and political 
matters. There are at least three possibilities: either the 
Frenchmen (rather than Habermas) or Habermas (rather than the 
Frenchmen) or finally Rorty (and neither Habermas nor the 
Frenchmen) are right. If Rorty were right -  even if it were to mean 
merely "if he were the most convincing of them" -  then all the 
others on the philosophical scene would be wrong. The only 
question is w hether R orty ’s position is acceptable  -  
philosophically, if not politically.
Rorty expresses his views on the subject (responding to 
Richard Bernstein’s objections) when he says that he attempted 
to separate in his writings what is called "postmodernism" from 
political radicalism, to separate polemics with "metaphysics of 
presence" with polemics with "bourgeois ideology", as well as 
criticism of Enlightenment rationalism from criticism of liberal, 
reformist political thought.2 Thus, in a word -  he tried to separate 
philosophy from politics, as a result of which he finally got 
"de-politicized philosophy" and "de-theorized politics" (as Thomas 
McCarthy puts it). And it is precisely the radical Rortyan withdrawal 
of philosophy from social matters, from the public sphere and 
joining it -  together with poetry -  to the private sphere that raises 
in (surely, non-analytic) America the greatest controversies and 
that accounts for the fact that Rorty is not an American intellectual 
hero as admired as Dewey or, still earlier, James, despite having
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p. 564.
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unheard-of among philosophers literary talent combined with 
erudition in the two philosophical traditions at the same time: the 
analytic philosophy and European thought. Taking away from 
philosophy its public relevance -  and perhaps still more taking 
public significance off from philosophers themselves -  is fiercely 
opposed by deconstructionists, feminists, leftist postmodernists 
from "Gay and Lesbian Studies", "Comparative Literature" and all 
those who are not quite happy, to put it mildly, with the American 
social and political status quo. Rorty’s stance is well know -  "we 
already have as much theory as we need" (and we need, in turn, 
"concrete utopias and concrete proposals how to reach them from 
the point we are at currently"3). Contemporary liberal society has 
institutions that help it changing for the better, as he says in 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Western social and political 
thought perhaps has already gone through the last conceptual 
revolution it needs, or as he put it in a similar manner in 
Consequences of Pragmatism:
On my view, we should be more willing than we are to 
celebrate bourgeois capitalist society as the best polity 
actualized so far, while regretting that it is irrelevant to 
most of the problems of most of the population of the 
planet4
It is from such and similar statements that arise accusations of 
"cynicism", "ideological apologia for an old-fashioned version of 
cold-war liberalism dressed up in fashionable ’postmodern’ 
discourse" or "apology of the status quo" (as in Richard 
Bernstein5), making radical theory "aestheticized, narcissized and 
bourgeoisified" and thereby "sterile" (in Nancy Fraser words6), or 
finally, most recently, of "terror", "assuring the continuance of the
3 Richard Rorty, "Réponse à Thomas McCarthy" in LireRorty, op. cit., p. 191.
4 Richard Rorty, CP, p. 210.
5 Richard Bernstein, "Rorty on Liberal Democracy and Philosophy" in New 
Constellations (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992), e.g. p. 249.
6 Nancy Fraser, "Solidarity or Singularity? Richard Rorty Between 
Romanticism and Technology" in Reading Rorty (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), ed. 
A. Małachowski, p. 314.
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status quo" and "cultural imperialism" for which he can be viewed 
as an "apologist" 7 The accusation of elitism is put forward by all 
the aforementioned critics -  in the case of Haber it is even "cavalier 
elitism". It is often noted that attacking Rorty has become the whole 
intellectual industry, the so-called "Rorty industry"; some criticisms 
do not bring about anything new to ongoing discussions, some of 
them open eyes of Rorty’s readers, and there is also some small 
part of it that opens the eyes of Rorty himself (and then he says, 
"Come on, there must be something to it: when they describe me 
like that I look really bad"8). Sometimes Rorty looks so bad in the 
eyes of his critics -  and the redescription of him is performed so 
skilfully and so convincingly -  that he has to answer serious and 
embarrassing questions such as the one asked by Bernstein about 
who precisely constitutes the "we" to which Rorty constantly refers 
in his writings, such as "we liberals", "we pragmatists", "we 
inheritors of European civilization" etc. (Bernstein: "Sometimes it 
seems as if what Rorty means by ’we’ are ’all those who agree 
with me’"9). Then he presents his political creed describing himself 
as a social democrat, making his answer very specific in eight 
points.10
Philosophy according to Rorty should stay clear from politics 
(like religion), it should not provide politics with "philosophical 
arguments", nor be "ammunition" for its guns, a weapon in its 
hands. Politics should be experimental rather than theoretical. As 
Rorty said in a famous (owing to numerous polemics) text read 
during the Philosophical Congress in Mexico in 1985,
We should not assume that it is our task, as professors 
of philosophy, to be the avant-garde of political 
movements. We should not ask, say, Davidson or 
Gadamer [or Rorty, for that matter? -  MK] for "political 
implications" of their view of language, not spurn their
7 As Honi F. Haber says in Beyond Postmodern Politics. Lyotard, Rorty, 
Foucault (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 44, 55, 44.
8 Richard Rorty, “Réponse à Thomas McCarthy", p. 180.
9 Richard Bernstein, "Rorty on Liberal Democracy and Philosophy", p. 247.
10 See Richard Rorty, "Thugs and Theorists", pp. 565-567
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work because of its lack of such implications. ... 
[Pjhilosophy should try to express our political hopes 
rather than to ground our political practices. On the view 
I am suggesting, nothing grounds our practices, nothing 
legitmizes them, nothing shows them to be in touch witn 
the way things really are.11
Such a solution to the relations between philosophy and politics 
requires a radical re-thinking of the public/private distinction in 
philosophy, requires considerations how to locate -  "agree" -  irony 
on the one hand and pragmatism on the other. This is the problem 
Rorty seems to be dealing with over many years and for which he 
seems to have found at least three solutions and which, so at least 
it seems to me, he tackles even today -  because, from my 
perspective, all solutions suggested by him until now are 
insufficient. Let us put some Rorty’s texts in three distinct groups, 
each of which provides a different answer to the question of 
philosophy and politics, that of elitism, aestheticism and solidarity; 
of the Bloomian, Romantic ("how to give birth to oneself" rather 
than to be a "footnote" to someone else, to use Whitehead’s 
saying) theme opposed to the Deweyan, pragmatic one, of 
self-creation and constructing oneself on the one hand and 
providing "social glue" on the other, of being a "strong poet" and 
his social responsibilities etc. etc., for oppositions can be multiplied 
almost indefinitely, using a multitude of (not only Rorty’s) 
vocabularies and metaphors.
2.
The first answer is given by, for instance, the following texts: 
"Solidarity or Objectivity", "From Logic to Language to Play", "The 
Contingency of Community", "The Contingency of Language" from 
London Review of Books, or "Private Irony and Liberal Hope” from 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity -  self-creational, ironist 
philosophers appear there as figures useful for the society; 
between freedom of intellectuals and lessening of suffering and
11 Richard Rorty, "From Logic to Language to Play'1, APA Proceedings, 
Special Report, p. 753 -  emphasis mine.
r
humiliation in the world of liberal democracy there is a visible link, 
in accordance with a more general belief that the transformation 
of the way we talk brings about the transformation of what we 
desire and what we think of ourselves and that a poet - in a general 
sense of the term -  is a creator of new words, shaper of new 
languages, being "the avant-garde of the species1'.12 What moral 
vocabulary one speaks, how one judges the reality, how one looks 
at the world -  this is decided by the imagination of strong poets, 
basically inaccessible to other fellow-humans (for although Freud 
"democratized" genius in Rorty’s view, and although everyone can 
be a self-creating individual, possess creative unconsciousness 
and shape himself-as there is no single "human nature", common 
to all people, nevertheless not everyone can become a strong poet 
who imposes his vocabulary on others rather than uses the 
vocabulary he inherited). Thus the first solution to the dilemma: 
private autonomy or pragmatic utility of the philosopher consists 
in showing public u tility  of the philosopher-intellectual- 
self-creator-ironist. If the world is safe for the poet, it is also safe 
for all others, one could say.
The second answer to the philosophy/politlcs relations is 
suggested, for instance, by the following Rorty’s texts: 
"N ine teen th-C entu ry  Idealism  and Tw en tie th -C en tu ry  
Textualism", "Method, Social Science, and Social Hope" (from 
Consequences of Pragmatism), "Habermas and Lyotard on 
Postmodernity", "Moral Identity and Private Autonomy: The Case 
of Foucault" (from Philosophical Papers), a chap te r on 
"Self-creation and Affiliation" from Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity or "Thugs and Theorists: A Reply to Bernstein". They 
show dangers inherent to intellectuals’ irony -  in their power of 
redescribing everything and everyone. And let us remind: "Ironism, 
as I have defined it, results from awareness of the power of 
redescription", and most people do not want to be redescribed 
because, as Rorty admits, "redescription often humiliates".13 Two 
motives, a "Romantic" and a "pragmatic" one, as Nancy Fraser
Philosophy and Politics 243
12 Richard Rorty, 'The Contingency of Language", London Review o f Books, 
17 April, 1986, p. 6.
13 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 90.
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calls them in her excellent tex t, already referred to here14, in that 
second account are not to be mixed with each other; pragmatism 
is democratic and society-oriented, Romanticism is egotistic and 
potentially cruel, they are opposed to each other and require a 
choice: either "private irony" or "public decency" (to refer to the title 
of McCarthy’s text).
Finally, the third answer comes from a chapter of Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity about "self-creation and affiliation", and, more 
generally, from the whole book, in which a separation between the 
private and the public sphere, as well as viewing them as 
incommensurable, is suggested ("equally valid, yet forever 
incommensurable", as Rorty says). The separation goes along the 
whole culture -  separating e.g. poetry and philosophy from the 
novel and politics -  to one’s final vocabulary in which there are two 
sectors. The domain of the ironist is the private, he is not entitled 
to enter politics (which was Heidegger’s fault) because politics, 
together with social problems, instrumental reason etc. belong to 
the public sphere. Such a philosopher -  whose philosophy is 
"publicly useless" -  cannot be the aforementioned in the first 
answer "avant-garde of the species", becoming rather an 
"aesthete" (which from a different side I am trying to show in 
discussions from the introduction and from the chapter on "Rorty’s 
self-creation”).
All three answers appear more or less at the same time, they 
do not follow one another as subsequent solutions to a stubborn 
problem. With different intensity they are -  all of them -  in 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. This gives birth to a noticeable 
tension between three chapters which in a slightly different 
versions appeared first in London Review of Books and chapters 
written later, also between chapters from the parts on 
"contingency" and on "irony" -  and chapters of the third part of the 
book, devoted to Nabokov and Orwell. The tensions in question 
seem to result not so much from inconsistency of the author, from 
an intentional providing several possible perspectives, several 
mutually opposing answers, but perhaps from Rorty’s inability, or 
still more his unwillingness, to give one convincing answerto some
14 Nancy Fraser, "Solidarity or Singularity?...", pp. 303, 304.
fundamental questions, including the one about philosophy and 
politics.
None of the three answers singled out here by us, none of 
solutions given (of which we will write in more detail in a moment), 
is convincing enough, either argumentatively, or rhetorically. The 
one that is most important of them and determines Rorty’s specific 
position in today’s metaphilosophical discussions -  the solution in 
the form of "the private/public split" -  rather cannot be maintained 
which I am suggesting throughout the book, especially while 
discussing Rorty’s Derrida. I am still unable to imagine a "liberal 
ironist" who has separate domains of the liberal and of the ironist 
at his disposal which "makes it possible for a single person to be 
both", as the closing sentence of Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity puts it. I also cannot see how Rorty himself might be the 
"liberal ironist" -  if I were to describe him with these two terms, I 
would say that he is rather a liberal who due to his attachment to 
freedom sometimes takes the liberty to be an ironist, but who, first 
of all, praises irony in other philosophers (such as Nietzsche, 
Derrida, to a much smaller degree Foucault) which is often merely 
one side of them. The separation between the private and the 
public -  this "fixed, rigid, ahistorical dichotomy", as Richard 
Bernstein writes of it15 -  cannot be maintained, for, it was itself 
born out of public and political views, beliefs of a liberal who is 
desperately seeking the possibility of building the world in which 
the point of reference would be freedom (rather than truth, but also 
rather than rationality or objectivity), the possibility of
leaving people alone so that they could dream, think and 
live as they wish, as long as they do not make harm to 
others.16
We shall return to this point but let us say by way of introduction 
that Rorty’s passion of a moralist makes the private/public split 
itself a public construction, resulting from deep political beliefs, that 
of the "priority of democracy to philosophy" in the foreground, that
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is the priority of a political choice over a "merely philosophical" one 
(as Rorty calls his differences with Habermas in Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity^7).
Let us sum up before passing on to details necessary in this
context: in the first version, or first answer, irony and liberalism are
equally essential for the society, irony via intellectuals just lends
liberalism its support (thus philosophy -  supports politics); in the
second version, irony and liberalism are opposed, Rorty shows
the "dark side" of irony; finally, in the third version, the two are
neither essential for the society, nor opposed in their interests but
rather kept far from each other owing to the private/public split
suggested by Rorty. His difficulties in answering the question -  or
rather unwillingness to give a priority of one answer to any other -
about relations between philosophy and politics may derive from
the acceptance of the Romantic vision of the philosopher as a
genius, self-creating, autonomous, idiosyncratic, unique artist as
well as the view of the philosopher as a pragmatic visionary who
thinks forthe needs of the society, inventing new utopias and roads
that lead to them from the current starting point. As Rorty does not
seem to be willing to abandon any of the two -  oppositional, as
they seem -  accounts of the philosopher, he is trying to "agree"
them with each other, looking for possible solutions. The three
answers result from the impossibility of convincing himself and
others that it is possible. "Trotsky" and the "wild orchids" cannot
be agreed (to use Rorty’s title, autobiographical metaphors) but I
am not sure whether the solution lies in a radical separation of the
private from the public sphere, of philosophy from politics, whether
the point is to reduce philosophy to the role of a useless
commentary to texts from tradition and to cut philosophy -  together
with poetry -  from the real world. I do not know whether this is
18desirable, I also do not know whether this is possible... 178
17 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 67.
18 Christopher Norris, Nancy Fraser, Richard Bernstein, Thomas McCarthy, 
Jürgen Habermas -  do know that this is neither desirable nor possible. My 
answer is not so unambiguous, perhaps owing to the image of the philosopher 
and the intellectual changing right before my eyes. My short, so far, philosophical 
road is located only in a new atmosphere of postmodernity; so I am personally 
neither linked (or attached) to the modern place and modern role of the
r
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Let us pass to details of the three answers. The first one -  
ironists are publicly useful for only they produce new metaphors, 
new tools to cope with the reality, to change the existing world to 
be better and less cruel. Let us discuss a passage from the text 
"The Contingency of Community" (for in the chapter from 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity it has been slightly modified). 
The ideal citizen of the ideal state would be someone who 
considers the strong poet to be the ideal human being. Such a 
citizen would think of strong poets as founders and defenders of 
his society. He himself can be a poet or not, can find his own 
metaphors for his own fantasies or not. But he would definitely be 
the one who thinks it obvious that it is the revolutionary artist and 
the revolutionary scientist -  Rorty goes on to argue -  rather than 
the academic artist and the normal scientist who embody virtues 
that are supposed to support his society.19 Heroes of Rorty’s 
liberal society, "the strong poet and the utopian revolutionary20, 
do not have to be alienated from the society, for it is just them who 
are
3 .
protesting in the name of society itself against those 
aspects of the society which are unfaithful to its own 
self-image.21
The aim of ironists is self-creation, private perfection, but the 
benefits of their struggles for their own redescriptions go for the
philosopher (as seen most clearly in the French tradition until Sartre, or 
even Foucault). Therefore my final view belongs to the future, for I do not want 
my answer to derive from experiences of others rather than my own beliefs. But 
one thing for me is certain -  the choice what philosophy is and who the 
philosopher is is an individual choice, it is a self-description to which the 
philosopher attempts to convince others. Some philosophers succeed in this, 
some do not. Some are lucky to be able to describe others, some are less lucky 
to be merely described by others. This is what I was taught by the heroic 
dimension of neopragmatism.
19 Richard Rorty, "The Contingency of Community", London Review of 
Books, 24 July, 1986, p. 14.
20 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 60.
21 Ibidem, p. 60.
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liberal society as a whole. Rorty says that there are "fairly tight 
connections between the freedom of the intellectuals on the one
pp
hand, and the diminuation of cruelty on the other". Freedom ofpo
the intellectuals is negative freedom as seen by Isaiah Berlin. If 
we "leave" ironist intellectuals "alone", then their imagination may 
become an important social tool, especially that bit of imagination 
that provides new descriptions. Let us remember about Rorty’s 
(potentially) extremely dangerous belief that "anything can be 
made to look good or bad, interesting or boring, by being 
recontextualized, redescribed"2 34 (which, incidentally, leads 
Bernstein to the conclusion that O’Brien from Orwell’s 1984 is 
Rorty’s true pupil who has diabolically mastered the lesson of 
contingency of all vocabularies; in both accounts, Rorty’s from 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity and O’Brien’s from an imagined 
Theory and Practice of Oligarchic Collectivism, man is an infinitely 
malleable being25). The producer of these recontextualizations 
and redescriptions is precisely the philosopher, intellectual, the 
one who is a "strong poet" from among them - changing the way 
we talk, he changes what we are and what we think, thereby 
becoming "the avant-garde of the species".26 As Rorty says,
There are many objections to what I have been saying, 
but the one which I find most disturbing says that / am 
treating democratic societies as existing for the sake of 
the intellectuals. I seem to be describing institutions 
which we constructed in order to prevent cruelty and 
obtain justice as if they had been constructed to 
safeguard the freedom of the leisured elite.27
22 Richard Rorty, "The Contingency of Community", p. 14.
23 Rorty in his "Habermas, Derrida, and the Functions of Philosophy" says 
the following: "The ideal liberal community will be one in which respect for such 
particularity and idiosyncrasy is widespread, one in which the only sort of human 
liberty which is hoped for is Isaiah Berlin’s ’negative liberty’ being left alone", a 
typescript, pp. 16-17.
24 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 113.
25 See Richard Bernstein, "Rorty's Liberal Utopia", pp. 289-291.
26 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 20.
27 Richard Rorty, "The Contingency of the Community, p. 14 -  emphasis
mine.
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But reading Rorty’s formulations both from earlier versions of 
three chapters from London Review of Books and their final 
versions from Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity as well, it is hard 
to resist getting the impression that Rorty is an elitist. Elitism 
hovers like a specter over the aforementioned bits of his work. 
Rorty says that he is perplexed between the statement that poets’ 
well-being is in the interest of non-poets (that is non-intellectuals, 
the majority of the society) and the awareness that perhaps he 
thinks so because it is much easier for us to identify with "poets" 
than with "peasants".28 Honi Fern Haber, already referred to (as 
well as used) here cannot stand such Rorty’s light-minded 
statements and comments angrily on them:
Is the poet really able to get outside of her own situation 
to understand that of another as she would have herself 
understood? We cannot be sanguine about the 
suggestion that there is no voice of the oppressed or 
about the consequence that the leisured elite will speak 
for them. ... This is simply wishful speaking on the part 
of one who is already satisfied with his position as a 
beneficiary of rich North American democracies. But 
what if one is not so satisfied?29
Thus Rorty, separating "intellectuals" from mere "human 
beings", promoting a Romantic vision of an artist, would be in 
Haber’s view playing a political role: that of consolidating the status 
quo. This is quite a wide-spread view among Rorty’s critics -  an 
apologia for American, capitalist, liberal-democratic and male 
reality is perhaps the political objection most often made by leftist 
philosophers and social theorist (still more understandable owing 
to the fact that Rorty almost obsessively speaks about "us 
relatively leisured intellectuals, inhabiting a stable and prosperous 
part of the world"30 or refers to himself as a "white male inhabitant
28 Ibidem, p. 14.
29 Honi F. Haber, Beyond Postmodern Politics. Lyotard, Rorty, Foucault, p. 55 
-  emphasis mine.
30 Richard Rorty, PMN, p. 359.
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of the richest part of the globe"31 in almost all of his books). The 
conclusion of the chapter on the "contingency of community" puts 
forward an alliance with Romantic poets and aestheticization of 
the society (keeping it safe for the poets in the hope that "the poets 
may eventually make it safe for everybody else"), according to 
Dewey’s view that the main tool for action for the sake of the good 
-  is imagination.
This is as far as Rorty’s first answer is concerned. Let us pass 
on to the second within which he shows dangers inherent to the 
choice of ironists as cultural heroes of his utopia and as moral 
advisors of the society -  by means of separating a Romantic and 
a pragmatic theme and abandoning the belief in (direct) utility of 
ironism and ironists. Pragmatism is democratic and public, 
Romanticism, as we already wrote, is egotistic and potentially 
cruel, ironism is antithetical to liberal politics and solidarity.
In the oldest text I managed to locate in this context 
("N ineteenth-C entury  Idealism and Tw entie th-C entury 
Textualism" from 1980), Rorty remembers moral objections made 
to textualism, that is, in his account of that time, to Foucault, 
Derrida, Bloom and the deconstructionist school from Yale. He 
notes that these are objections that pertain also, at the same time, 
to the pragmatic belief that there are only changing vocabularies 
(as "temporary historical resting places") -  and thus that the very 
vocabulary of the liberal democracy cannot be grounded in 
anything non-historical and non-contingent.32 Let us pay close 
attention to Rorty’s sentences, taking his doubts from 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity ten years backwards:
the stimulus to the in te llectua l’s private moral
imagination provided by his strong misreadings, by his
31 Richard Rorty in A.N. Balslev, Cultural Otherness. Correspondence with 
Richard Rorty (New Delhi: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1991), p. 86.
32 In another text from Consequence of Pragmatism, “Pragmatism, 
Relativism, and Irrationalism", Rorty says the following: "The pragmatists tell us 
that the conversation which it is our moral duty to continue is merely our project, 
the European intellectual’s form of life. It has no metaphysical nor 
epistemological guarantee of success", p. 172.
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search for sacred wisdom, is purchased at the price of 
his separation from his fellow-humans.33
Rorty at that time did not have answers to such doubts. 
Pragmatism and textualism -  in this account -  were "morally 
dangerous"34. The eighties in Rorty’s thought can also be viewed 
as repeated attempts to answer the question how to combine 
self-realization, private fulfilment-with public morality, a concern 
for justice, as the last sentence of the text referred to says. It seems 
to me that a gradual "privatization" of philosophy, relegation of it 
to the private sphere (and opposing it, for instance, to the novel as 
a vehicle of liberal progress) in the eighties, taking away its 
significance and aspirations -  which I attempted to show in my 
“paraevolution" of Rorty’s philosophy on a Rortyan conference in 
Torun35-  is Rorty’s escape from making a radical, and sometimes 
tragic, choice. "Separation from one’s fellow-humans”, "isolation 
from common, human concerns" is the "price" to be paid for the 
emergence of the ironist literary culture with which it is hard, if at 
all possible, for Rorty as a moralist to agree. How to unite "private 
fulfilment" and a "concern for justice" -  the three answers to the 
question about relations between philosophy and politics outlined 
here are intended to account for the significance of the question 
and its stubborn recurrence in various forms over the years in 
Rorty’s writing.
In another text that I associate with the second answer 
("Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity"), Rorty gives a direct 
answer to the question about the intellectual's utility: he should not 
be seen as serving social needs when he fulfils his self-creational 
needs ("a need for the ineffable, the sublime, a need to go beyond 
the limits, a need to use words which are not part of anybody’s 
language-game, any social institution"36). It is no use pretending 
that one is the avant-garde of the humankind and serves the
33 Richard Rorty, CP, p. 158 -  emphasis mine.
34 Ibidem, p. 159, n. 15.
35 See Marek Kwiek, "On Some Rorty’s Evolution”, in English, with R. Rorty’s 
"Response to Marek Kwiek", Ruch filozoficzny 50, no. 2/1993, pp. 195-200.
36 Richard Rorty, "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity", PP 2, p. 176.
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wretched of the earth, Rorty tells Lyotard and other French 
postmodern thinkers.
The ironist awareness of the "power of redescription" is a strong 
weapon which can humiliate, the intellectual can thus be cruel, 
cold (writing "from a point of view light-years away from the 
problems of contemporary society", in Rorty’s memorable and 
unjust description of Michel Foucault), and harmful. Potentially the 
most dangerous can be an ironist theory -  and ironist theorists, 
like Nietzsche and Heidegger who treat themselves as examples 
to be followed by other people (as well as transpose ironism to 
politics). The private self of a self-creating philosopher cannot 
serve as a model for others for it is contingent and restricted to just 
one person. When a Romantic intellectual begins to thinkthat other 
people have a moral duty to achieve the same autonomy as he 
himself has achieved, then his politics tends to become antiliberal, 
then he begins to think about "political and social changes which 
will help them do so. Then he may begin to think that he has a 
moral duty to bring about these changes, whether his fellow 
citizens want them or n o t'2,7 And then he may ally with the power 
that brings about desirable changes -  be it with the Nazi movement 
(as Heidegger who kept believing that he can become the 
philosopher of new, National-Socialist Germany, the creator of a 
new, German university etc. etc.). Europe, Spirit, Being (history, 
W estern man, metaphysics) -  th inking in terms of "a 
larger-than-self hero"37 8, a faith in a "big secret"39, make them 
potentially dangerous theoreticians of ironism rather than mere 
ironists, like Marcel Proust. Rorty draws a penetrating picture of 
traps waiting for the intellectual on the dark side of irony.
So it would seem that there should be a choice between the 
society of eccentrics, ironists, aesthetes and elitists -  and a liberal 
society. The either/or dichotomy seems to require a choice, it can 
be seen as unavoidable, were it notforthe third and the last Rorty’s 
answer to the question about the knot of philosophy and politics,
37 Richard Rorty, "Moral Identity and Private Autonomy: The Case of 
Foucault", PP 2, p. 194 -  emphasis mine.
38 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 100.
39 Ibidem, p. 99.
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the answer sketched mainly in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. 
the idea of the private/public split, getting rid of the opposition of 
the two spheres by relegating them to radically separate spheres, 
remaining according to Rorty with no relation to each other.
In the third account traced here, the private sphere becomes 
the domain of ironist philosophy, the public sphere -  the domain 
of politics. Philosophy has become "more important for the pursuit 
of private perfection rather than for any social task".40 The third 
answer does not require of Rorty a choice between "sublimity" and 
"decency", "private irony" and "liberal hope", "private autonomy" 
and "moral identity", to refer once again to several key oppositions 
from different texts. Philosophy gets devoid of any influence on 
social reality, ironist theory has only one use -  to shape the 
(self)-image of men of letters, suggesting new descriptions which, 
nevertheless, stay clear of politics, left for social and political 
engineers. So the ironist philosopher does not change the reality 
in Rorty’s view -  he can only project visions of the future. As Rorty 
said in his reply to Richard Bernstein, the difference between them 
concerns the utility of theory, including philosophy as part of it, in 
thinking about today’s political situation -  as opposed to its 
usefulness in inventing liberal utopias. The main use of philosophy 
is "inventing our utopian visions".41
The French help us in deciding "what to do with our loneliness", 
they are useful only for private purposes, although obviously 
private (ironist) and public philosophers produce parallel 
philosophical discourses between which we do not have to 
choose; they have different conceptions of philosophy and 
philosopher which we do not have to juxtapose and favor (or reject 
-  generally speaking, according to Rorty, we should give them 
equal weight and -  in accordance with the view of philosophy as 
a tool -  "use them for different purposes",42) This is as far as the 
past is concerned, that is, the history of philosophy in which there 
are Marx and Kierkegaard, or Dewey and Nietzsche; today, the
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41 Richard Rorty, "Thugs and Theorists", p. 369.
42 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. xiv.
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best, the least dangerous, idea is not to take philosophy too 
seriously, which I am discussing separately.
Nancy Fraser describes Rorty’s position in one word -  
"aestheticism". The strong poet is no longer an (also social) 
revolutionary endowed with unbound imagination, no longer is he 
the "avant-garde of the species" mentioned in the "Contingency of 
Language" -  in her words, "strictly speaking, indeed, the 
intellectual will have no social role or political function".43 Nobody 
can expect much from him -  nobody can judge him on the basis 
of the utility of his theories. The traditional connection between 
theory and practice is broken, the result of a radical split between 
the private and the public being no less radical separation between 
theory and practice, philosophy and politics. Theory gets devoid 
of its political implications, politics is no longer supported by or 
based on theory but rather on "experimenting" (to which Rorty 
allude in Mexico). Thomas McCarthy comments:
Critical thought becomes aestheticized and privatized, 
deprived of any political or social implications. There can 
be no politically relevant critical theory and hence no 
theoretically-supported critical practice.44
And he is right with one significant reservation: he does not take 
into account the fact that Rorty’s philosophy is future-oriented and 
not present-oriented, it focuses on the "hope" (one of key words 
in his writings) rather than on the change of current state of affairs 
(for, as Rorty often asks, "what can we do, we philosophy 
professors?"). According to him, there is not any end of philosophy, 
or end of theory; it is rather so that they gradually lose their 
attractive power, they become ineffective in comparison with 
journalistic reports, ethnography, films or -  the novel (which is 
probably only Rorty’s great, mythical dream). Rorty accepts that 
cultural transformation as one of the first thinkers in our 
philosophical culture, for others it is too hard to stand (and 
therefore he often stresses the "peripheral" character of
43 Nancy Fraser, ''Solidarity or Singularity?...'', p. 312.
44 Thomas McCarthy, "Ironie privée et décence publique", p. 94.
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philosophy as one of numerous humanistic disciplines). He also 
says that philosophy professors do not have any special access 
to weapons for fights with injustice or racism, the future of the world 
will not depend on them, like the dangers for future of "abnormal 
discourse" do not come from science or naturalistic philosophy but 
rather from "scarcity of food and from the secret police", as he says 
in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 45
The third answer to the question about relations between 
philosophy and politics does not seem more satisfactory than the 
previous two -  for Rorty does not seem to be able to maintain it 
from some neutral point; the reference always is liberal democracy 
and public beliefs aboutthe need of separation between the private 
sphere from the public one in order to avoid the dangers of ironism. 
Rorty’s vocabulary within it is a political, public one, the vocabulary 
of liberalism which requires that radical theory should be relegated 
to the private sphere, leaving one vocabulary as obligatory, the 
vocabulary of liberal democracy loved by Rorty. Irony gives up 
here in front of liberalism, but for Rorty there is no other alternative. 
It is difficult to keep politics far from privacy for, as Foucault and 
Barthes, for instance, has shown, "politics is everywhere", 
"everything is political" -  our culture, our language, our prisons, 
fashions, everyday choices, accounts of sexuality, norms and 
pathologies... The Rortyan version of relations between 
philosophy and politics is strongly criticized for it goes against the 
mainstream thinking about traditional obligations ascribed to 
philosophy (and to intellectuals by e.g. Antonio Gramsci in his 
Prison Notebooks, Ju lien Benda in The Betrayal o f the 
Intellectuals, Jean-Paul Sartre in What is Literature? or, recently, 
Edward Said in Representations of the Intellectual On the other 
hand, though, even with a very charitable attitude towards the 
solution discussed here, it is difficult not to come to the conclusion 
that Rorty’s arguments are not fully convincing (that his 
redescription is not powerful enough). We fully agree with Rorty’s 
conclusions about philosophy and politics, but we cannot accept 
his justification as strong enough. Although we look very 
sympathetically to Rorty’s thinking about philosophy and
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philosopher in relations with politics, we do not find the solution in 
the form of the split between the public and the private really good. 
The searches are going on, we do hope that there will appear a 
more convincing rhetoric that in accordance with the spirit of 
postmodernity will provide convincing justification of the fact that 
politics and philosophy cannot be mixed.
UNIWERSYTET IM. ADAMA MICKIEWICZA W POZNANIU













Tadeusz Buksiński (Editor in Chief), Bolesław Andrzejewski, 
Anna Pałubicka, Jan Such, Jarema Jakubowski (secretary)
Cover design by Jolanta Rubczak
Cover illustration: Joan Miró, "Woman III", 1965
Copyright © Marek Kwiek, 1996
ISBN 83-7092-026-8
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Instytutu Filozofii 
Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu 
60-569 Poznań, ul. Szamarzewskiego 89c, fax 471-555
Druk: COBRABiD-UNIDRUK s.c.
Poznań, ul. 28 Czerwca 1956 r. 223/229, tel. (061) 31-11-86, 31-11-90
